Sodium borohydride is intermediate to the jackhammer that is LAH and the pussycat that is cyanoborohydride.
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Mars Phoenix sent home a series of images of frost accumulating
on the mirror of the telltale --a four-inch instrument used to sense wind direction and
velocity on the lander. Although frost was also seen accumulating on the ground a few days ago, and around rocks during the Viking missions in the
1970’s, this image is striking because of how the frost sparkles on the mirror’s
surface.
The frost accumulated from 12:54 a.m. to 2:34 a.m. at the landing site on August 15th, 2008, or 80 Martian “sols” into the mission. The mission was originally expected to last 90 sols but it has now been extended to 120 sols according to a recent Twitter post.
To conserve bandwidth, only the portion of the image
containing the telltale and the mirror were downloaded in every frame. The “movie”
made from all the images pieced together was then superimposed on the full
frame of the telltale to give the backdrop for the images.
The frost is not a problem for the operation of the spacecraft.
Frost Accumulation on Telltale Mirror [University of Arizona]
See Also:
Image courtesty NASA/JPL/University of Arizona
The Economist, that venerable British magazine about money, has opened a new online debate on the future of energy.
The debate presents the pro and con sides to the following proposition: "We can solve our energy problems with existing technologies today, without the need for breakthrough innovations."
Representing the Pros will be Joseph Romm, senior fellow at the Centre for American Progress, while Peter Meisen, president of Global Energy Network Institute, leads off for the Cons.
Judging from our comments section, this is an issue near-and-dear to the hearts of many WiSci readers.
And Internet users, like yourselves, are free to join in the moderated debate and vote on which side you think is winning. There will also be expert guest participants including Mujid Kazimi, director of MIT's Center for Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems and my old Earth2Tech editor, Katie Fehrenbacher.
My quick take is that it's going to take half (or all of) the debate to define what "our energy problems" actually are. Sure, we got a few -- declining oil finds in an oil-addicted world, atmospheric CO2 accumulation, billions of people without electricity -- but which one should have priority?
Image: flickr/Mommy Peace
WiSci 2.0: Alexis Madrigal's Twitter , Google Reader feed, and webpage; Wired Science on Facebook.
Tiny spacecraft, each weighing less than the average man, could help NASA launch more missions for less money.
But there's one problem: small craft can't employ the sophisticated HVAC systems and shields that larger craft do. That makes them susceptible to temperature swings and micrometeorite damage.
Today, however, researchers unveiled a new plastic skin that helps regulate microspacecraft temperatures by flipping between reflecting and absorbing light. That could extend the range of small craft beyond low-earth orbit, where most of them have been deployed to-date.
"Because of the miniaturization of all kinds of spacecraft technology, these nano and micro spacecraft are becoming more plausible and possible in many types of missions," said Jason Hines, chief technologist for the Small Spacecraft Divison at NASA. "It's our dream and vision and hope that eventually we can place smaller spacecraft in all types of missions, not just in near earth orbit."
The Space Shuttles stand 185 feet tall and weigh over 4 million pounds. Back in the 80s, it was seen as the pinnacle of NASA's program. But times have changed. Budgets are smaller and some within the agency say that the spacecraft should shrink, too.
While some missions will require large spacecraft, some tasks could be carried by smaller craft, at huge cost savings to NASA. Launching a pound of anything into space costs about $5,000.
The new material could extend the range of uses for microspacecraft, perhaps even allowing them to travel to the moon and beyond.
"For those missions, you can be at various distances from the sun and being able to change your thermal balance is a good thing," said Siegried Jansen, a senior scientist at The Aerospace Corporation, who has worked extensively with satellites under 15 pounds.
That's because the material could reduce the amount of power required to maintain the temperature of a small craft. Microsatellites are tiny, so they have a limited amount of space for solar cells to provide them with energy. The new material could help redefine the capabilities of microcraft, NASA's Hines said.
As can be seen in the inset picture, applying a little bit of electrical current to the new material changes how the material reflects light in the visible and infrared spectrums. When positive voltage is applied to the material, it darkens and radiates heat. When negative voltage is applied, it lightens and reflects more light, insulating the vehicle on which it's installed. This so-called "variable emittance" property mimics many of the more complex systems present on large spacecraft that help regulate their internal temperatures.
And at one-hundredth of an inch thick, the thin-film coating is still durable enough to withstand the onslaught of space pebbles.
"The test for micrometeoroids was very simple — we just fired a gun loaded with small particles and tiny, harpoon-like needles at it," said Prassana Chandrasekhar, a researcher with the Ashwin-Ushas Corporation which created the material with NASA, in an announcement at the national meeting of the American Chemical Society.
The material is slated for use in the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's experimental Micro-Inspector Spacecraft, which could travel with and help repair larger vehicles, like the Crew Exploration Vehicle, NASA's shuttle replacement. Chandrasekhar, though, said that the material could find a wide array of applications.
"A lot of spacecraft engineers have come to us saying 'If we had this technology, it would give us much greater design freedom for future micro-spacecraft,'" he said.
Images: 1. Courtesy of NASA. An artist's rendering of the microsatellites, the ST5 Spacecraft, launched in February 2006. 2. Courtesy of Prassana Chandrasekhar.
WiSci 2.0: Alexis Madrigal's Twitter , Google Reader feed, and webpage; Wired Science on Facebook.
又做了一个报告
2008.08.18
美国化学会236届年会于8月17-22日在费城(Philadelphia)召开。美国化学会年会一年两次,参会人数在两万左右。各国来参加美国化学会年会的化学家和学生很多,不了解的人千万不要以为冠了“美国”二字,就是美国的地方性会议,而不是国际会议了。相比之下,IUPAC(国际纯粹与应用化学会)的会议规模要小多了。
我最近几年基本上是每年来参加一次美国化学会的年会。每次来都是做40分钟左右的邀请报告。美国化学会的Symposium上邀请报告的要求并不那么严格,不过常常有不同Symposium的Organizer邀请,我还是觉得很荣幸。因为美国化学会上的Symposium非常多,所以做报告就像在大卖场中练摊的感觉一样。总之是内行看门道,外行看热闹。
我们这个Symposium的专题叫做Water Mediated Interaction:Structure and Dynamics。今天早上由我第一个做报告,时间是早上8:20到9:00。我的报告题目是:Structure of adsorbed molecules and water species at aqueous interfaces with nonlinear spectroscopy。
昨天晚上和博士导师以及同一研究组的几位师兄师姐一起晚餐。回来以后继续修改ppt,一直搞到临晨3点才睡觉。今天做完报告后,才轻松下来。
今年是美国化学会物理化学分会(Division of Physical Chemistry)成立100周年,所以有一些庆祝活动。物理化学分会专门请了20位著名的科学家,其中包括7位诺贝尔化学奖(主要是物理化学)获得者,在今明两天做专题回顾报告。我今天一直在听自己分会的报告,所以今天的这几个报告一个都没去听。当然,事实上其中好几个报告的内容我都在不同场合听过了。中间休息时我去他们做报告的会场看了一下,听的人真的不少,总有1000人以上。晚上5:30到6:30,物理化学分会请大家在Leows Hotel的33楼lounge参加庆祝酒会,我也跑去凑了一会儿热闹。好几百号到一千人左右挤在那里,的确很热闹。
李远哲先生一直是我们国家重点实验室的名誉主任,2002年他到化学所来也是我负责接待他,所以我也上去和他谈了一会儿话。他说他最近一段时间主要在Berkeley,还和我谈起他最近在Berkeley听一个界面非线性光学学术报告的一些想法和评价。
It was supposed to start up in June, at which time the Earth would explicitly NOT be sucked into a tiny black hole. Or at least not quickly. Or at least not a black hole any different than the thousands that are already forming in our upper atmosphere more or less constantly.
Did it start up? No. There have been continued delays, or more accurately (perhaps), the exact startup depends on things that cannot be precisely measured mainly because they have never been done before and it is a good idea to take one's time. I'm pretty sure the legal challenges have not been part of the delays.
Real high energy work with the machine is currently moved back to October 2008, although it is hard to find this information anywhere on the CERN site. But have a look.
Read the comments on this post...Followup to: Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom, Löb's Theorem
Peano Arithmetic seems pretty trustworthy. We've never found a case where Peano Arithmetic proves a theorem T, and yet T is false in the natural numbers. That is, we know of no case where []T ("T is provable in PA") and yet ~T ("not T").
We also know of no case where first order logic is invalid: We know of no case where first-order logic produces false conclusions from true premises. (Whenever first-order statements H are true of a model, and we can syntactically deduce C from H, checking C against the model shows that C is also true.)
Combining these two observations, it seems like we should be able to get away with adding a rule to Peano Arithmetic that says:
All T: ([]T -> T)
But Löb's Theorem seems to show that as soon as we do that, everything becomes provable. What went wrong? How can we do worse by adding a true premise to a trustworthy theory? Is the premise not true - does PA prove some theorems that are false? Is first-order logic not valid - does it sometimes prove false conclusions from true premises?
Actually, there's nothing wrong with reasoning from the axioms of Peano Arithmetic plus the axiom schema "Anything provable in Peano Arithmetic is true." But the result is a different system from PA, which we might call PA+1. PA+1 does not reason from identical premises to PA; something new has been added. So we can evade Löb's Theorem because PA+1 is not trusting itself - it is only trusting PA.
If you are not previously familiar with mathematical logic, you might be tempted to say, "Bah! Of course PA+1 is trusting itself! PA+1 just isn't willing to admit it! Peano Arithmetic already believes anything provable in Peano Arithmetic - it will already output anything provable in Peano Arithmetic as a theorem, by definition! How does moving to PA+1 change anything, then? PA+1 is just the same system as PA, and so by trusting PA, PA+1 is really trusting itself. Maybe that dances around some obscure mathematical problem with direct self-reference, but it doesn't evade the charge of self-trust."
But PA+1 and PA really are different systems; in PA+1 it is possible to prove true statements about the natural numbers that are not provable in PA. If you're familiar with mathematical logic, you know this is because some nonstandard models of PA are ruled out in PA+1. Otherwise you'll have to take my word that Peano Arithmetic doesn't fully describe the natural numbers, and neither does PA+1, but PA+1 characterizes the natural numbers slightly better than PA.
The deeper point is the enormous gap, the tremendous difference, between having a system just like PA except that it trusts PA, and a system just like PA except that it trusts itself.
If you have a system that trusts PA, that's no problem; we're pretty sure PA is trustworthy, so the system is reasoning from true premises. But if you have a system that looks like PA - having the standard axioms of PA - but also trusts itself, then it is trusting a self-trusting system, something for which there is no precedent. In the case of PA+1, PA+1 is trusting PA which we're pretty sure is correct. In the case of Self-PA it is trusting Self-PA, which we've never seen before - it's never been tested, despite its misleading surface similarity to PA. And indeed, Self-PA collapses via Löb's Theorem and proves everything - so I guess it shouldn't have trusted itself after all! All this isn't magic; I've got a nice Cartoon Guide to how it happens, so there's no good excuse for not understanding what goes on here.
I have spoken of the Type 1 calculator that asks "What is 2 + 3?" when the buttons "2", "+", and "3" are pressed; versus the Type 2 calculator that asks "What do I calculate when someone presses '2 + 3'?" The first calculator answers 5; the second calculator can truthfully answer anything, even 54.
But this doesn't mean that all calculators that reason about calculators are flawed. If I build a third calculator that asks "What does the first calculator answer when I press '2 + 3'?", perhaps by calculating out the individual transistors, it too will answer 5. Perhaps this new, reflective calculator will even be able to answer some questions faster, by virtue of proving that some faster calculation is isomorphic to the first calculator.
PA is the equivalent of the first calculator; PA+1 is the equivalent of the third calculator; but Self-PA is like unto the second calculator.
As soon as you start trusting yourself, you become unworthy of trust. You'll start believing any damn thing that you think, just because you thought it. This wisdom of the human condition is pleasingly analogous to a precise truth of mathematics.
Hence the saying: "Don't believe everything you think."
And the math also suggests, by analogy, how to do better: Don't trust thoughts because you think them, but because they obey specific trustworthy rules.
PA only starts believing something - metaphorically speaking - when it sees a specific proof, laid out in black and white. If you say to PA - even if you prove to PA - that PA will prove something, PA still won't believe you until it sees the actual proof. Now, this might seem to invite inefficiency, and PA+1 will believe you - if you prove that PA will prove something, because PA+1 trusts the specific, fixed framework of Peano Arithmetic; not itself.
As far as any human knows, PA does happen to be sound; which means that what PA proves is provable in PA, PA will eventually prove and will eventually believe. Likewise, anything PA+1 can prove that it proves, it will eventually prove and believe. It seems so tempting to just make PA trust itself - but then it becomes Self-PA and implodes. Isn't that odd? PA believes everything it proves, but it doesn't believe "Everything I prove is true." PA trusts a fixed framework for how to prove things, and that framework doesn't happen to talk about trust in the framework.
You can have a system that trusts the PA framework explicitly, as well as implicitly: that is PA+1. But the new framework that PA+1 uses, makes no mention of itself; and the specific proofs that PA+1 demands, make no mention of trusting PA+1, only PA. You might say that PA implicitly trusts PA, PA+1 explicitly trusts PA, and Self-PA trusts itself.
For everything that you believe, you should always find yourself able to say, "I believe because of [specific argument in framework F]", not "I believe because I believe".
Of course, this gets us into the +1 question of why you ought to trust or use framework F. Human beings, not being formal systems, are too reflective to get away with being unable to think about the problem. Got a superultimate framework U? Why trust U?
And worse: as far as I can tell, using induction is what leads me to explicitly say that induction seems to often work, and my use of Occam's Razor is implicated in my explicit endorsement of Occam's Razor. Despite my best efforts, I have been unable to prove that this is inconsistent, and I suspect it may be valid.
But it does seem that the distinction between using a framework and mentioning it, or between explicitly trusting a fixed framework F and trusting yourself, is at least important to unraveling foundational tangles - even if Löb turns out not to apply directly.
Which gets me to the reason why I'm saying all this in the middle of a sequence about morality.
I've been pondering the unexpectedly large inferential distances at work here - I thought I'd gotten all the prerequisites out of the way for explaining metaethics, but no. I'm no longer sure I'm even close. I tried to say that morality was a "computation", and that failed; I tried to explain that "computation" meant "abstracted idealized dynamic", but that didn't work either. No matter how many different ways I tried to explain it, I couldn't get across the distinction my metaethics drew between "do the right thing", "do the human thing", and "do my own thing". And it occurs to me that my own background, coming into this, may have relied on having already drawn the distinction between PA, PA+1 and Self-PA.
Coming to terms with metaethics, I am beginning to think, is all about distinguishing between levels. I first learned to do this rigorously back when I was getting to grips with mathematical logic, and discovering that you could prove complete absurdities, if you lost track even once of the distinction between "believe particular PA proofs", "believe PA is sound", and "believe you yourself are sound". If you believe any particular PA proof, that might sound pretty much the same as believing PA is sound in general; and if you use PA and only PA, then trusting PA (that is, being moved by arguments that follow it) sounds pretty much the same as believing that you yourself are sound. But after a bit of practice with the actual math - I did have to practice the actual math, not just read about it - my mind formed permanent distinct buckets and built walls around them to prevent the contents from slopping over.
Playing around with PA and its various conjugations, gave me the notion of what it meant to trust arguments within a framework that defined justification. It gave me practice keeping track of specific frameworks, and holding them distinct in my mind.
Perhaps that's why I expected to communicate more sense than I actually succeeded in doing, when I tried to describe right as a framework of justification that involved being moved by particular, specific terminal values and moral arguments; analogous to an entity who is moved by encountering a specific proof from the allowed axioms of Peano Arithmetic. As opposed to a general license to do whatever you prefer, or a morally relativistic term like "utility function" that can eat the values of any given species, or a neurological framework contingent on particular facts about the human brain. You can make good use of such concepts, but I do not identify them with the substance of what is right.
Gödelian arguments are inescapable; you can always isolate the framework-of-trusted-arguments if a mathematical system makes sense at all. Maybe the adding-up-to-normality-ness of my system will become clearer, after it becomes clear that you can always isolate the framework-of-trusted-arguments of a human having a moral argument.
A study that touted the benefits of Vioxx, a painkiller that killed thousands, wasn't science: it was marketing propaganda.
"The trial was designed by Merck's marketing division to fulfill a marketing objective," write researchers granted access to internal company memos and reports concerning the ADVANTAGE trial, which concluded that Vioxx had fewer gastrointestinal side effects than its competitors.
Vioxx was eventually shown to double heart attack risks, and killed an estimated 30,000 people between 1999 and 2003. Merck responded grudgingly to early alarms, then fudged data to downplay the drug's risks. They eventually paid $5 billion to settle some 25,000 individual lawsuits and 100 class-action suits -- and that, said analysts, was just a fraction of their liability. The drug is no longer manufactured.
The latest ADVANTAGE analysis, written by scientific consultants to lawyers suing Merck, adds another chapter to this sordid saga.
"Merck's marketing division handled both the scientific and the marketing data, including collection, analysis, and dissemination; and Merck hid the marketing nature of the trial from participants, physician investigators, and institutional review board members," they write.
An accompanying editorial excoriates Merck's approach, known as a "seeding" trial:
Why would a drug company go to the expense and bother of conducting a trial involving hundreds of practitioners—each recruiting a few patients—when a study based at a few large medical centers could accomplish the same scientific purposes much more efficiently? The main point of the seeding trial is not to get high-quality scientific information: It is to change the prescribing habits of large numbers of physicians. A secondary purpose is to transform physicians into advocates for the sponsor's drug. The company flatters a physician by selecting him because he is "an opinion leader" and incorporates him in the research team with the title of "investigator." Then, it pays him good money: a consulting fee to advise the company on the drug's use and another fee for each patient he enrolls. The physician becomes invested in the drug's future and praises its good features to patients and colleagues. Unwittingly, the physician joins the sponsor's marketing team. Why do companies pursue this expensive tactic? Because it works.
Bloomberg.com has a good analysis of this story, as does the Philadelphia Inquirer.
The ADVANTAGE Seeding Trial: A Review of Internal Documents [Annals of Internal Medicine]
Seeding Trials: Just Say "No" [Annals of Internal Medicine]
Video: Mediamonarchy
See Also:
WiSci 2.0: Brandon Keim's Twitter and Del.icio.us feeds; Wired Science on Facebook.